Social Policies and Governance in Geneva: What About Social Innovation? by unknown
97
P. Naegeli ()
4, av. du Simplon, 1225 Chêne-Bourg, Switzerland
e-mail: Patricia.Naegeli@unige.ch
Chapter 6
Social Policies and Governance in Geneva: 
What About Social Innovation?
Patricia Naegeli
6.1  Introduction
The governance of the Swiss welfare state is marked by the principle of subsidiar-
ity (Bütschi and Cattacin 1993), which favours private initiative before state action 
and according to which tasks are divided between the three territorial levels: the 
Confederation, the cantons and the municipalities. The result is multilevel gover-
nance (Scharpf 1994), both hierarchically within the state and, in principle at least, 
horizontally between all the welfare organisations involved (public and private for 
and non-profit; see Cattacin 1996). Until the mid-1970s, federal social policies and 
insurance were marginal, social benefits were mostly in the hands of private, sub-
sidised non-profit associations and social insurance was private and mutualised by 
working sector, ideology or religion. From 1975 to 1985, when other European 
countries were already cutting social benefits, the federal welfare state caught up 
and finally normalised its position within the rest of Europe (Cattacin 2006, p. 50). 
So, if in Switzerland basic social insurance1 has been progressively introduced and 
centralised (Gilliand 1988, pp. 39–58), following the principles of subsidiarity and 
federalism, the federal state determines through legislation a minimum level of so-
cial protection, giving the cantons and municipalities a great degree of freedom to 
improve and manage their own social policies.2 This path dependency (Merrien 
1990) results in significant cantonal autonomy and gives rise to huge differences 
1 For an overview of the adoption and implementation of social insurance legislation in Switzer-
land, see Gilliand (1988, p. 58).
2 In Switzerland, cantons and municipalities have a high degree of autonomy, particularly in areas 
such as education, healthcare and social policies. As a result, social policies can be very well de-
veloped in a canton or kept to the minimum level required by the Swiss Confederation. But it is 
precisely at the local level (cantons and municipalities) that innovation can be implemented most 
easily. An example of the division of powers between the federal and cantonal levels in social 
policy matters can be found in Armingeon et al. (2004, p. 22).
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in social benefits throughout the country (Armingeon et al. 2004; Höpflinger and 
Wyss 1994).
As argued by Cattacin (1996), it is exactly this local autonomy—a result of Swit-
zerland’s federal structure, according to which the national territory is divided into 
26 cantons—that makes possible innovative social policies at the local level. Ac-
cording to Bertozzi and Bonoli (2003), this cantonal freedom makes it possible to 
match local social needs and territorialised social policies. In their words:
While the federal structure of the state may have hindered the development of certain social 
policies, it has also fostered innovation at the local and cantonal levels as well as adaptation 
with respect to the social needs of territorial units. (Bertozzi and Bonoli 2003, p. 13)
So Swiss cantons should have enough room to manoeuvre to adapt their social poli-
cies to particular, territorialised needs. The major question of this chapter is whether 
this cantonal autonomy, particularly with respect to the governance of the social, re-
ally does lead to the implementation of innovative social policies.3 As an example, 
we analyse Geneva, which is known for its comparatively generous social policies 
(Höpflinger and Wyss 1994, p. 55, IDHEAP/BADAC 2010a, b, c, d, e4), and which, 
as a city-canton,5 has a particularly large degree of autonomy in determining its 
social policies. In the case of Geneva, references to the “local level” mostly apply 
to cantonal measures rather than city ones, for reasons that will appear throughout 
this chapter. We explore whether Geneva’s governance arrangements tend to favour 
or disfavour innovative social policies and which elements appear to hinder their 
emergence. As was underlined in Chap. 2 (Cattacin, Zimmer), by governance ar-
rangements we mean the outcome resulting from complex processes that involve a 
multitude of actors (the state, non-state organisations, the market) and which have 
to be understood in their context (the institutional context, the context of welfare 
governance arrangements and the local political culture). It will become clear that 
Geneva’s governance of the social policies, embedded in its context, tends to place 
the state and its administration, especially state councillors and civil servants, as the 
legitimate provider of social services. But this state orientation is only possible with 
3 What we mean by innovation will be defined later in this chapter.
4 Statistics on the website of the IDHEAP/BADAC (Institut des hautes études en administration 
publique/base de données des cantons et des villes suisse) show that the Canton of Geneva, in 
comparison with the other 25 cantons, has high expenses for culture and social activities (6.41 % 
of public expenses, rank 1) and social security (23.18 % of PE, rank 1) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010a); 
has the second-highest per capita expenditures, after Basel-Stadt (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010b); has 
the second-highest income inequality (a Gini coefficient of 0.45) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010c); has, 
together with the Canton of Zug, the second-highest number of additional social benefits (ID-
HEAP/BADAC 2010d); and is the administration with by far the highest number of subdivisions 
(105 services for 7 departments, rank 1) (IDHEAP/BADAC 2010e). It is important to notice that 
while Geneva consistently ranks second in many of these measures, the first place is not always 
occupied by the same canton.
5 Geneva is both a canton and a city. The Canton of Geneva encompasses 45 municipalities and 
476,000 inhabitants in a territory of 282 km2. The city of Geneva is the most important munici-
pality in the canton, with 195,160 residents. Its territory measures 15.9 km2 (statistics for end of 
2013). See Swissworld and Département fédéral des affaires étrangères (2014) and Ville de Ge-
nève (2014a). It is for this reason that we argue that the city is almost the canton and vice-versa.
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the support of non-profit organisations,6 which are heavily subsidised and whose 
demarcation from the public sector is often unclear. Furthermore, the importance 
of political parties in Geneva’s political culture and the influence of the republican 
model of neighbouring France, where power tends to be concentrated, may partly 
explain our findings. Economic actors are excluded from this state-orientated wel-
fare system. As a result of these factors, we hypothesise that social innovation is 
above all incremental and that when it does occur, it does so due to a certain con-
sensus among the implied actors. Indeed, despite political differences, the idea of 
working against poverty (what stakeholders call “solidarity”) seems to be, together 
with “personal responsibility”, the key deep core value, and the necessity of impos-
ing it mostly top-down justifies the state orientation. This basic consensus on this 
fuzzy concept of “solidarity” was emphasised by our interviewed stakeholders and 
is in line with our own observations.
This chapter was written within the framework of the European project Wel-
fare Innovations at the Local Level in Favour of Cohesion (WILCO). It includes a 
wide range of sources: political debates in city council and the cantonal parliament, 
the political programmes of most important parties, local newspaper articles, grey 
literature, statistical data provided by the public administration, 12 semi-directed 
interviews with local stakeholders7 and two focus groups to clarify diverging or 
shared positions regarding local welfare.8
The chapter is divided into five parts. First, we will introduce the main chal-
lenges in Geneva’s governance and identify the general tendencies of its local wel-
fare governance arrangements. Second, its local welfare state and social policies 
will be situated in the Swiss context. Third, hypotheses concerning Geneva’s main 
actors in the field of social policies will be developed. Sabatier’s approach (Sabatier 
1991, 1998), which assumes the existence of coalitions of values, and of power re-
lationships between these coalitions, leading to majorities and minorities in specific 
policy fields, will guide Part 3.9 More specifically, emphasising the importance of 
political parties within these coalitions, the balances of power over the last 20 years 
will be described. Fourth, an examination of the actual programmes of the main 
political parties and interviews with local stakeholders will reveal the core values 
of the local welfare state, while specific issues in the fields of unemployment and 
6 By non-profit organisations we mean organisations that provide welfare benefits but which are 
also an essential “[…] ‘public space in civil societies’ […] at the intersection between the state, the 
marketplace and the informal sector” (Evers 2000, p. 567).
7 For more information about the interviews, please see footnote 62.
8 I would like to thank the following people who have collaborated with me on the WILCO proj-
ect: Nathalie Kakpo, who did part of the field- and deskwork in Geneva; Sandro Cattacin for his 
critical and pertinent input; and Maxime Felder for his support and comments during the writing of 
this chapter. I would also like to thank Christian Jöhr of the Social Service of the City of Geneva, 
who was a helpful discussion partner regarding concrete issues in the city, and all persons who 
agreed to be interviewed during this research.
9 This approach assumes that the cities’ policies are influenced by a constellation of actors, namely 
policymakers, fieldworkers, scholars, civil servants and journalists, who share a common belief 
system (values, problems and perceptions) and are capable of acting in a coordinated way.
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childcare will strengthen our understanding thereof and permit us to define value 
coalitions. Fifth, we will question Geneva’s capacity to innovate in the area of social 
policies and examine whether its governance of social challenges results in innova-
tive social policies or the preservation of the status quo.
6.2  Geneva’s Challenges: Multilevel Governance and 
Multiple Territories
Geneva is part of one of the most dynamic regions in Switzerland, situated at the 
extreme southwest of the country. Home to several international organisations, an 
important banking sector and quality business services, as well as world-class re-
search centres, including the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), 
Geneva is definitely an important international player in the globalised economy.
This aspect of the “International Geneva”, oriented beyond Switzerland’s na-
tional borders, is emphasised by local stakeholders and Geneva’s city marketing and 
goes hand in hand with its geographical location, which is almost outside the coun-
try (Cattacin and Kettenacker 2011). Indeed, Geneva is situated at the very edge of 
Switzerland, sharing only a 4.5-km border with the rest of Switzerland but a 103-km 
border with France.10 Notwithstanding its economic and international importance, 
the canton occupies a somewhat marginalised position within the country, and it 
is common to hear that Geneva is not “really Swiss”, whatever that might mean.11
This assumption is reinforced by the fact that Geneva’s main social challenges 
are not contained within the logic of borders and concern the whole metropolitan 
area of 918,000 inhabitants,12 namely the Grand Genève, which includes neigh-
bouring France and the Canton of Vaud (District of Nyon). At the end of 2013, 
cross-border workers, officially defined as “non-Swiss” people who live in neigh-
bouring France and work in Geneva, numbered 68,800. This is one quarter of all the 
cross-border workers in the country.13 It is interesting to note that the high numbers 
of Swiss who live in neighbouring France, often clandestinely, are not included in 
these statistics.14
Geneva’s social challenges are de facto supra-regional, although the logic of 
governance remains strongly territorialised, confined to the municipal and cantonal 
levels, as a result of which there is no territorial authority to solve important chal-
lenges such as delays in the construction of more public transit, traffic problems and 
the enormous problem of the lack of affordable housing. This incongruence between 
10 Source: Ville de Genève (2014a).
11 Source: Der Spiegel (1985).
12 Source: Grand Genève (2014a).
13 (Office cantonal de la statistique — OCSTAT/Département des finances 2013).
14 In 2009, two out of three new immigrants to France were Swiss (Grand Genève 2014a). But 
most of them do not declare that they live full-time in France and therefore do not pay taxes where 
they live, a significant problem for the French municipalities concerned.
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the nature of the problems, which are cross-border and regional, and the problem-
solving structures, which are strongly territorialised, is not unique to Geneva, of 
course, and it is especially common in states with different relatively autonomous 
and powerful levels of government, as is the case in Switzerland. According to Klöti 
1985, p. 13, 17, this situation can result in steering and legitimation problems in 
urban policies and conflicts of interest between the different levels of government:
That is why urban policies have to be able to handle a conflict of interest between 
supralocal requirements and local needs. Above all at the level of the agglomera-
tion, there is no authority that can intervene in a regulatory and coordinator manner 
(Klöti 1985, p. 17).
In the case of Geneva, a Grouping for Transfrontier Co-operation15 was officially 
created in 2012 for the purpose of governing the Grand Genève. It is an autonomous 
body under Swiss public law with legal personality and its own budget, and it is 
charged with realising projects within the Franco-Vaud-Geneva conurbation and 
deal with regional challenges. But uncooperative local authorities and regional gov-
ernments on both sides of the border confront this grouping and, most importantly, 
by the rise of the populist MCG (Geneva Citizens’ Movement),16 which leads to an 
“anti-cross-border workers” attitude, the most recent example of which is the recent 
popular vote against a cross-border construction project.17
While Grand Genève must remain in our minds when we speak about Geneva, 
this chapter focuses on the Canton of Geneva, which includes 45 municipalities, 
including its most important, which is of course the City of Geneva.18 Geneva’s 
unusual way of doing politics and governing its “small” territory, where the canton 
is almost the city and vice versa, is often pointed out by other parts of the country, 
which more or less explicitly criticise Geneva’s multilevel governance, where no 
one really knows “who does what” and that “wouldn’t exist if Geneva weren’t so 
rich”, as stated in a Bernese newspaper article (Chapman 2012).
Indeed, the same newspaper article refers to a crucial point in Geneva’s multilev-
el governance—disagreements between cantonal and city governments on impor-
tant political issues—and the ability to block important (cantonal or city) projects 
by exercising the municipal or cantonal right to a veto, for instance, for construc-
tion projects, not least because of NIMBYism.19 While tensions often crystallise 
between the city and the canton, the canton’s 44 other municipalities also represent 
15 Groupement de coopération transfrontalière (GLCT; Grand Genève 2014a).
16 In Part 3, we will discuss birth and rise of this political party.
17 In the aftermath of the Swiss popular initiative on 9 February 2014 (accepted by 50.34 % of vot-
ers), which requires the introduction of immigration quotas (60.9 % of Geneva’s population voted 
against it), the canton’s population voted against financial participation in a cross-border parking 
construction project, following the arguments of the MCG, which is opposed to any financial in-
vestment on the “French side” (De Weck 2014; La Tribune de Genève 2014).
18 For more details, please refer to footnote 5.
19 “More formally, Not In My Back Yard (NIMBY) refers to the protectionist attitudes of and op-
positional tactics adopted by community groups facing an unwelcome development in their neigh-
bourhood” (Dear 1992, p. 288); see also Kübler (1995), who analysed these kinds of strategies in 
the field of urban drug policies.
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important political and financial constraints, even if their powers and financial re-
sources are less important than in other Swiss cantons.20 The consequence is that 
important projects may be paralysed, sometimes for decades,21 which is evidence 
for the argument that Geneva is stuck in a joint decision-making trap (in the sense of 
Scharpf 1985) that makes it difficult, because of cantonal or municipal “veto coali-
tions” (Czada 2003, p. 183), to overcome the status quo. According to Czada, a gov-
ernment’s ability to solve (social) problems rapidly (Czada 2003, p. 197) depends 
on the interplay of three dimensions: the degree of agreement between political par-
ties, the degree of corporatism and the nature of constitutional veto structures. In his 
opinion, Swiss democracy compensates for the threat posed by potential vetoes by 
producing strong legislative majorities, which has resulted in a political landscape 
that has been stable for many years. But this stability can also be endangered, as 
has been the case in Geneva (see Part 3 on the evolution of political forces). Fur-
thermore, difficulties related to multilevel governance also interfere with what we 
call the governance of the social and the provision of social services and benefits. 
Indeed, overlapping services between cantonal, city and municipal administrations, 
coupled with the multiplicity of private, above all non-profit, organisations, makes 
it difficult to even identify governance arrangements and service providers in this 
sector. The analysis of 120 qualitative interviews of vulnerable migrants who were 
or had been in touch with local welfare services in the 20 cities of the WILCO 
research22 indicates clearly that a multitude of (overlapping) services significantly 
discourages (vulnerable) people from claiming social benefits and leads to mistrust 
of the public administration (Cattacin and Naegeli 2014).23 Furthermore, services 
have also been criticised for not being able to address complex life situations result-
ing from intersecting problems, which may increase the risk of multiple discrimina-
tion (Hankivsky and Cormier 2010).
In Geneva, duties have been split between the canton, which is responsible for 
individual social assistance, and the municipalities, which are responsible for “com-
munitarian” and collective problems. For instance, the canton provides basic finan-
cial and individual social assistance through the Hospice Général, an autonomous 
public institution that was created in 1535 and is mandated by the canton.24 These 
financial benefits are sometimes supplemented by the City of Geneva through its 
own Social Service, meaning that a resident of the City of Geneva may receive a 
greater social allowance than someone who resides in another municipality within 
20 According to a newspaper article, the allowed budget for the municipalities constitutes less than 
20 % of all public expenses in the canton, which, according to Mabut (2014), is very low for Swiss 
municipalities.
21 For example, after 50 different proposals since the nineteenth century, plans to create some kind 
of link between the two shores of Lake Geneva (traversée de la rade) have still not been imple-
mented. See, for instance, Francey (2014).
22 For a description of the research, please refer to footnote 7.
23 If we add mistrust of public administrations to the mentioned overlapping services, which result 
in the feeling that one is lost in a labyrinth of welfare organisations, it is easy to understand why 
vulnerable people (in this case vulnerable migrants) may simply avoid claiming social benefits.
24 In the Swiss context, this is an exception; social assistance is usually provided by municipalities.
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the canton. Furthermore, the municipal Social Service works from the perspective 
of proximity to and the prevention of social problems and has developed a ter-
ritorialised “communitarian” approach that aims to reinforce social cohesion.25 As 
a result, a multitude of actors constitute a labyrinth of local welfare organisations, 
mostly non-profit organisations. Aware of the overlapping public services between 
the canton and the city, the current cantonal government has decided to disentangle 
its duties from those of its 45 municipalities (Mabut 2014; Moulin 2014), a task that 
it wants to complete in close cooperation with the Association of the Municipalities 
of Geneva and its representatives. A first technical report has just been published 
(Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014), whose purpose is to assess the current 
situation. According to this report, there are 12 main areas in which there is signifi-
cant overlap, including social services, where it is not always clear which duties be-
long to the municipalities and which to the canton because “the distinction between 
these two fields of public action is difficult to make, because every community 
social action aims finally to improve the social and economic situation of individu-
als” (Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014, p. 8).26
Our interviews with 12 local stakeholders and two focus-group discussions have 
shown a relatively clear consensus in the political arena regarding the necessity of 
keeping a strong local welfare state and on the view that it is the responsibility of 
the state (and e.g. not the private sector) to help vulnerable people. We may assume 
that this state-oriented welfare mix27 is specific to Geneva in Switzerland, which is 
known to correspond to a hybrid conservative-corporatist model with liberal ten-
dencies, according to the classical typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, pp. 74–77), 
or to constitute a “compromise between Liberalism and Socialism” (Möckli 1988, 
p. 27). Indeed, for a long time the Swiss welfare state has been considered a wel-
fare laggard (Bonoli and Mach 2000, p. 140), especially regarding health insurance 
(which only became compulsory in 1996), family policy and long-term unemploy-
ment benefits. But this welfare laggard reputation has to be taken with a grain of 
salt. Indeed, Möckli (1988, pp. 24–25) has shown the pioneering character of some 
social and political laws, for instance, laws regarding the social protection of chil-
dren in factories (1815)28 and the first Swiss factory law of 1877, which introduced 
25 One of the innovations selected for study by the WILCO project was one of the organisations 
involved in implementing this “communitarian” work at the city level, namely the UAC (Union 
for Community Action), which is located in four areas of the city and whose principal aims are to 
connect relevant associations with interested civil-society participants and, therefore, to reinforce 
collective action through better coordination and networking (City of Geneva 2014).
26 Original quotation: “La distinction entre ces deux champs d’action publique pour sa part reste 
malaisée, toute action sociales communautaire visant au final à l’amélioration de la situation so-
ciale ou économique d’individus” (Groupe de travail technique (GTT) 2014, p. 8).
27 By welfare mix, we mean the interplay of public and private (non- and for-profit) organisations 
in the steering, planning and providing of social welfare services, or “the combination of different 
actors and sectors involved in coproducing welfare programs, services and/or goods” (Oosterlynck 
et al. 2013, p. 19). To examine the welfare mix is also to examine the diversity of the organisations 
involved.
28 The two pioneering cantons were Zurich and Thurgau, which were the first jurisdictions in 
Europe to pass legislation in favour of child labourers in factories, although it did not have any 
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the 11-h day, pioneering legislation for continental Europe. And more recently, as 
Cattacin (2006, p. 49) has demonstrated, the 1970s were a decade of growth for the 
Swiss welfare state, in contrast to other European states, which had already begun 
cutting their social spending by then. Furthermore, the specificities of federalism 
result in complex cohabitations between public and private structures, between the 
state, the economy and civil society (Cattacin 2006, p. 50), which can lead to the be-
lief that the welfare state at the federal level is weak. But the author underlines that 
today the Swiss federal welfare model, rather than being an exception, has become 
an international reference point for individualisation and activation processes:
The transformations of welfare pluralism in Switzerland in recent years have re-
sulted in the fact that it no longer is an exception, retarded, particularly complex or 
catching up, or reveals a counter-tendency, but has instead become an international 
reference point for the individualisation of responsibilities, the activation of citizens 
and even the strengthening of incentives and the moderation of the different welfare 
providers (Cattacin 2006, p. 69).29
Also, Swiss pensions and unemployment benefits tend to be generous in com-
parison with those of other European countries (Bonoli and Mach 2000, p. 140). 
As regards innovative and pioneering social policies, in short, Geneva once had the 
reputation of having both.
6.3  Pioneering Local Welfare State?
According to a newspaper article in the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Geneva was once 
“a future-oriented laboratory for Switzerland […]” (Büchi 2012). It was the first 
canton, together with the Canton of Vaud, to introduce the right to vote for Swiss 
women in 1959, long before it was introduced at the federal level in 1971 and in 
other cantons. According to the same article, Geneva also had progressive urban 
planning and the most generous social policies of all the cantons, thanks to its ex-
panding financial sector. But the article also claims that Geneva’s potential for inno-
vation has run its course, and that “today, the Republic of Geneva is only a shadow 
of its former self” (Büchi 2012).
Even if it seems true, at first glance, that Geneva has actually lost its force to 
propose future-oriented projects and policies, some recent examples regarding Ge-
neva’s pioneering30 social policies can still be found. Indeed, in 1991, Geneva was 
impact (Möckli 1988, p. 24).
29 Original quotation: “Les transformations du welfare pluralism en Suisse durant ces dernières 
années en font aujourd’hui non plus un cas exceptionnel, retardé, particulièrement complexe ou 
encore en récupération en contre tendance, mais une référence internationale en ce qui concerne 
l’individualisation des responsabilités, l’activation des citoyens ou encore l’incitation et la mo-
dération des acteurs producteurs de bien-être” (Cattacin 2006, p. 69).
30 Of course, what is pioneering in a certain context is not necessarily so in another. In this ex-
ample, the context is the Swiss Confederation. We will return to this point when defining precisely 
what we mean by social innovation.
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the first and only canton to introduce the right for undocumented children to go to 
school (Halle 2011). In 2001, it implemented maternity leave at the cantonal level, 
while it was only adopted federally in 2005, exactly 60 years after a right to mater-
nity leave at the federal level was inscribed in the constitution, and this only after 
having been rejected four times by popular vote. Even so, federal maternity leave 
benefits are quite minimal—14 weeks of paid maternity leave at 80 % of the last 
salary—and address only working mothers or those who are at least registered with 
the unemployment office.
This example illustrates the function of the federal state: It intervenes only when 
it has to fulfil shortcomings in cantonal regulations and when broad coalitions at the 
national level demand its support to implement social policies that are not developed 
enough at the cantonal level (Cattacin 1996). Indeed, as said before, social policies are 
mainly managed at the cantonal and city levels, the three levels—federal, cantonal and 
municipal—cohabitating in multilevel governance, based on the constitution and history 
of the Swiss Confederation, which is directly linked with the principle of direct democ-
racy, and which itself requires negotiations between all actors that could potentially, and 
easily, launch a referendum against new laws. The path dependency characteristic of 
Switzerland31—the decentralisation or rescaling of social policies—seems to be com-
mon to most European countries, according to Kazepov:
As a reaction to the crisis of the welfare state, reform processes—in their double 
meaning of vertical and horizontal subsidiarisation—produced a steady shift from 
a vertical towards a horizontal coordination of social policies, which finds its ideal 
level of implementation in the local dimension. Despite the fact that these tenden-
cies are common to most European countries, the development and institutionali-
sation of the new governance arrangements do not converge. On the contrary, the 
results of these processes of change seem to produce a territorially structured diver-
sification […]. This diversification varies according to socio-economic context and 
institutional arrangements, with all the specificities this might entail: from a high 
degree of freedom of the Comunidades Autonomas in Spain, the Länder in Germany 
or the Cantons in Switzerland, to the relatively low intranational differentiation in 
France (Kazepov 2010, p. 49).
But this cantonal jurisdiction over social policy does not explain why Geneva’s 
social policies often exceed the minimal federal level and tend to be generous by 
Swiss standards. In their article “Swiss Worlds of Welfare” (Armingeon et al. 2004), 
the authors explain the significant variation in cantonal welfare regimes by socio-
economic variables and above all by the degree of urbanisation, which seems to be 
positively correlated with the election of left-wing parties, which favour a state-
oriented welfare policy. According to the authors:
31 The Swiss Constitution, which was adopted in 1874, did not grant any jurisdiction over social 
policies to the federal state. In 1890, a popular vote made it constitutionally possible for the first 
time for the Swiss Confederation to create national social policies through legislation. This vote 
was a key moment in the establishment of a national welfare state, which became increasingly 
powerful. This constitutional change resulted in the adoption in 1911 of the first national health 
and accident insurance (implemented in 1914 and 1918, respectively), and in the adoption of the 
old-age pension in 1946 (implemented in 1948). See (Gilliand 1988, pp. 55–57) for details.
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Urbanisation is obviously a major socio-economic explanatory variable for can-
tonal social security systems. Left-wing power is strongly and positively correlated 
with urbanisation (0.64): the more urban a canton, the higher the share of left-wing 
parties in government. On the other hand, the more rural a region, the better the 
odds for centrist parties (correlation with urbanisation: − 0.54). In contrast, the pow-
er of right-liberal government is not significantly related to urbanisation. Hence, 
one could argue that urbanisation is the major background variable explaining both 
worlds of welfare and the political strength of the left in Swiss cantons (Armingeon 
et al. 2004, p. 39).
Accordingly, Geneva’s high degree of urbanisation should tend to favour left-
wing parties and could therefore explain the state-oriented development of social 
policies. Moreover, Armingeon et al. (2004) categorise the Canton of Geneva as 
a social-democratic regime for three out of four of their selected variables,32 em-
phasising that it is one of the only cantons to possess a somewhat coherent welfare 
regime. It is also the only one that can be classified as social-democratic in the 
country (Armingeon et al. 2004, pp. 34–35).
6.4  Actors and Power Relations Around Social Policies
These interrogations raise the question of who are the actors who define social 
policies and the values behind them. According to Neidhart (1970, pp. 287 ff., 294, 
313) and Kriesi and Jegen (2001), direct democracy implies that political projects 
are largely debated in the administrative or pre-parliamentary arena and that these 
debates have to integrate negotiations from all kinds of actors to avoid the launching 
of a referendum against the proposed law or project. So direct democracy often im-
plies the finding of a consensus between the implied actors, and sometimes, when 
the debate is very conflictual, we can speak about a compromise rather than a con-
sensus. According to Sabatier (1991, 1998), the actors are constituted in competing 
advocacy coalitions33 within a policy subsystem34 that share a common belief sys-
tem organised around core values and secondary aspects. Within the core values, he 
32 The four variables are employment, education, taxation and social security.
33 “An advocacy coalition consists of actors from many public and private organizations at all lev-
els of government who share a set of basic beliefs (policy goals plus causal and other perceptions) 
and who seek to manipulate the rules of various governmental institutions to achieve those goals 
over time” (Sabatier 1991, pp. 151; 153). These coalitions develop power relations, which result in 
the emergence of majorities and minorities. Another definition is provided by Kriesi et al. (2006, 
p. 342): “[…] at a given moment, in a given subsystem, we are likely to find a limited number of 
coalitions with varying influence on the political processes within the subsystem. […] Coalitions 
can be composed of one type of actor only (homogeneous), or they can incorporate different actor 
types (heterogeneous).”
34 “A subsystem consists of actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are ac-
tively concerned with a policy problem or issue, […] and who regularly seek to influence public 
policy in that domain” (Sabatier 1998, p. 99).
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distinguishes the deep core, meaning fundamental normative and ontological axi-
oms, from the policy core, which are the strategies used to achieve the core values. 
Furthermore, Sabatier argues that the coalitions and core values remain relatively 
stable for a decade or longer and are therefore difficult to change. So policy learn-
ing most often only applies to the secondary aspects, which comprise a multitude of 
instrumental decisions that are necessary to implement the policy core. Kriesi et al. 
(2006, pp. 342–343), building on Sabatier’s theory regarding advocacy coalitions 
and the power distribution between them, add the idea of a relational perspective on 
the policy process. According to this theory, power is either fragmented or concen-
trated, and the type of interaction is characterised by the predominance of conflicts, 
bargaining or cooperation.
Of course, these policy-specific power structures are determined by the macro-
political context, meaning, among other things, the extent to which political actors 
are induced to co-operate informally (related to the distribution of power) and the 
policy phase, assuming that the type of interaction becomes more conflictual in 
critical policy phases. The power relations vary from one policy domain to another. 
According to Kriesi et al. (2006), Switzerland’s distribution of power is clearly 
fragmented and interaction tends to be cooperative rather than conflictual. But this 
does not mean that consensus democracies cannot be conflictual or bargaining as 
well, depending on the political issue involved.
Based on these theoretical findings, we assume that in Geneva, with respect to 
direct democracy and the welfare mix, which includes by necessity a fragmentation 
of power, state actors (state/city councillors and the related civil servants, often 
themselves members of political parties) and political parties are the dominant ac-
tors in determining local welfare policies. Therefore, they have a strong impact on 
defining the welfare state’s core values. If, following the principle of subsidiarity, 
non-profit organisations play an important role in welfare provision and are part of 
the debate, we expect their core values to largely be in line with those of the state, 
not least because of the important state subsidies they receive. In other words, we 
hypothesise that the above-mentioned groups dominate the advocacy coalitions that 
shape the core values of social policies, and that their goal in public debate is to 
link themselves with state-oriented welfare services, which develop from the values 
defined by them. In turn, we assume that the presence of this “strong” welfare state 
legitimises the predominance of political parties and state actors in public debate, 
leading to a sort of virtuous circle in which fundamental changes in values, and 
therefore in policies, are difficult to make. Following this logic, we assume that 
policy innovation therefore tends to be incremental, remaining within the existing 
logic of state orientation.
Finally, we may also attribute the predominance of political parties and stake-
holders from the public administration to the influence of neighbouring France, 
where power is more centralised. In this sense, Geneva presents a certain concentra-
tion of power and conflictual and ideological debates between political parties that 
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challenge state-centred administration and its stakeholders, sometimes leading to 
political deadlock.35
Following these assumptions, it is first necessary to examine the development of 
political forces in Geneva over the past two decades. We may then apprehend the 
core values of the local welfare state, especially in the fields of unemployment and 
childcare.
6.4.1  Canton of Geneva: From Two Coalitions to Three (and a 
Half)
As said before, Geneva has two elected assemblies: a cantonal parliament and a city 
council.36
The cantonal parliament (Grand Conseil) comprises 100 members who are elect-
ed by popular vote for 5 years,37 according to a proportional-representation electoral 
system. At the city level, the 80 members of the city council (Conseil Municipal) are 
elected every 4 years. There has been an important evolution in the constellations 
of power within these two legislative bodies over the past two decades. Regarding 
the composition of the Grand Conseil, between 1993 and 2001, there were only two 
(mutually opposed) coalitions: the Entente (centre-conservative parties, including 
the Liberals, the Radicals38 and the Christian Democratic Party) and the Alternative 
(left-wing parties, including the Socialists, the Greens and the Labour Party, the lat-
ter becoming the Left Alliance39 between 1993 and 2001). Traditionally, except in 
35 Examples of political deadlock are the linking of the two shores of Lake Geneva (footnote 22) 
and the expansion of the main railway station, which provoked lively debates and mobilised the 
inhabitants of the area behind the railway station; see, for instance, Pasteur and Armanios (2011). 
But also in Geneva, there is a desire for more political pragmatism and less ideology. One example 
is the recent cross-party group, which includes members of all political parties except the Swiss 
People’s Party (UDC), to start a pilot project to regulate the consumption of cannabis through Can-
nabis Consumer Associations; see, for instance, Zünd (2014).
36 Of course, all the other 44 municipalities also have their own city councils.
37 The mandate can be renewed indefinitely. Before the introduction of the new cantonal constitu-
tion in 2013 (accepted in October 2012), members were elected for 4 years (République et canton 
de Genève 2012a, Arts. 80–81; Arts. 101–102).
38 The Liberal Party and the Radical Party merged and became the Liberal-Radicals in 2013, after 
having lost four seats in the 2009 elections (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancel-
lerie d’Etat 2013a).
39 The Labour Party sat in the cantonal legislature from 1945 to 1989. In 1989 it was renamed the 
Left Alliance and gathered various far-left coalitions (for instance Solidarités and Independants). 
The party changed its name again in 2005 to the Ensemble à Gauche. It continues to group various 
far-left coalitions and sometimes struggles with internal divisions. Together with the Greens and 
the Socialists, it constitutes the so-called Alternative, in opposition to the Entente. It is interesting 
to note that the Ensemble à Gauche was absent from the cantonal legislature between 2005 and 
2013. For more information, see the official statistics of the canton (Office cantonal de la statis-
tique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
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the 1997 election,40 the centre-conservative parties have always held a majority in 
the cantonal legislature. But since 2001, the legislature has also included the clearly 
right-wing Swiss People’s Party41 (UDC: Union Démocratique du Centre), and 
from 2005 on the Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG: Mouvement Citoyen Gene-
vois), which bases its programme on the protection of Geneva’s residents from the 
“invasion” of cross-border workers. This new party made a dramatic entry. Between 
2005 and 2013, it increased its seats from 9 to 20, and it also placed one member 
in the cantonal executive in 2013. The fact that the MCG shared a common list for 
the elections of the 2013 executive with the far-right UDC allows us to assume that 
it lies at the right end of the political spectrum, even though it claims to be “neither 
right nor left”,42 a dichotomy that it claims is “history” and is perpetuated by politi-
cal parties that do not respond to the needs of Geneva’s population.
So, regarding the cantonal parliament, we can speak about the end of an era of 
polarisation between left (Alternative) and centre-conservative parties (Entente), in 
favour of the existence of three or even four groups and a situation in which there 
is no longer any clear majority, and where the “historical parties” have to compete 
with far-right and populist parties, the latter (MCG) alternating between right and 
left ideologies, depending on the issue.43 Overall, the right is more powerful in 
parliament.44
The cantonal executive45 is also dominated by representatives from the centre-
conservative and right-wing parties. Except after the 2005 election, when four 
members of the Alternative46 faced three members of the Entente, the executive has 
always been right wing. As mentioned before, what was new in the 2013 elections 
was the election of one member of the MCG, placing the two members of the Alter-
native (one Socialist and one Green) in a very marginalised position.
The cantonal governance of Geneva historically has always been consistently 
conservative, a stability that is currently being challenged by the presence of the 
self-styled “non-determined” populist party MCG. At city council, however, until 
2011 the forces were exactly the opposite.
40 In 1997, the Alternative won a majority with 51 of the 100 seats (Office cantonal de la statis-
tique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
41 The translation of the Union Démocratique du Centre as the Swiss People’s Party follows the 
party’s original name, which is Schweizerische Volkspartei.
42 “Neither left nor right” (MCG—Mouvement Citoyen Genevois 2014b).
43 Some argue that the MCG is on the left on social issues and on the right on security, European 
and immigration issue (Favre 2013).
44 Composition of the Geneva cantonal parliament 2013: Entente 35, Alternative 34, UDC 11 and 
MCG 20 (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013a).
45 The cantonal executive is composed of seven state councillors who are elected directly by the 
population by majority vote. Since the 2012 change to the Geneva Constitution (entered into force 
in 2013), they are elected for 5 years. One member is designated president for the whole period 
and is the head of the newly constituted presidential department. The other six members are each 
in charge of a specific department (République et canton de Genève 2012b).
46 Two Socialists and two Greens for one Radical, one Liberal and one representative of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chancellerie d’Etat 2013b).
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6.4.2  The City of Geneva: From the Dominance of the Left to 
Complex Coalitions
From 1995 to 2011,47 the Alternative held an absolute majority in Geneva’s city 
council. It is interesting to note that in 1999, the Left Alliance, a coalition of far-left 
parties, was the most important party in city council, before the Socialists, which 
are the most important party today, followed directly by the Liberal-Radicals. As in 
the cantonal parliament, city council is no longer composed of its two opposite co-
alitions ( Entente and Alternative); instead, since 2003, and especially since 2011, it 
has also included the two “newcomers”: the Swiss People’s Party48 (UDC, far right) 
and the Geneva Citizens’ Movement (MCG). So, since the 2011 election, with 39 
of 80 seats, the Alternative has been just shy of an absolute majority and is obliged 
to seek some alliances outside of its long-term coalition, for instance with the MCG 
or the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), which can sometimes tilt the balance 
towards their political preferences. As in the canton, the minority parties have the 
power to tilt the balance between the two “traditional” coalitions, if we assume that 
the latter vote as a bloc in accordance with their parties’ instructions. As we will 
see below, however, things are not always that simple: Internal conflicts (above all 
within the far-left coalition) and moving coalitions depending on the policy issue 
involved are affecting the stability of the established coalitions.
At the executive level, things are more stable. From 1991 to 2011, the left had 
a majority—three out of five seats between 1991 and 1999, and four out of five 
between 1999 and 2011.49 So we have to keep in mind that the executive’s majority 
is no longer the same as that of the city council on which it relies, which creates 
additional tensions and sometimes causes political debates to take a long time when 
the issues are conflictual. One current example is the finally accepted renovation of 
Les Minoteries, a complex of 329 subsidised apartments owned by the city whose 
maintenance has been neglected for the past 40 years. The executive proposed a 
renovation of 90 million CHF (about 72 million €). The proposal was rejected twice 
47 Composition of the city-council coalitions from 1991 to 2011. 1991 Entente 40, Alternative 40; 
1995: Entente 36, Alternative 44; 1999 Entente 36, Alternative 44; 2003 Entente 27, Alternative 
44, UDC (far right) 9; 2007 Entente 29, Alternative 42, UDC 9; 2011 Entente 22, Alternative 39, 
UDC 8, MCG (populist) 11 (République et canton de Genève 2014).
48 In fact, the Swiss People’s Party (UDC) may be new in Geneva, but it is well established in the 
Swiss-German part of the country, being the predominant party in several regions. For an analysis 
of this party, see Mazzoleni (2008).
49 Executive, City of Geneva: 1991 Liberals 1, Radicals 1, Socialists 1, Greens 1, Labour Party 
1; 1995 same as in1991, but instead of Labour Party, Left Alliance; 1999 Liberals 1, Socialists 1, 
Labour Party 1, Left Alliance 1; 2003 same as 1999. 2007 Radicals 1, Socialists 2, Greens 1, À 
Gauche Toute 1 (new name for the Left Alliance); 2011 same as 2003, but À Gauche Toute became 
Ensemble à Gauche (Together on the Left). In 2012 a by-election replaced the radical magistrate 
with a member of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Note that the composition of the Left 
Alliance/Labour Party and its name changed for every election, so we can assume that the Left 
Alliance’s coalition is not stable at all. Source: (Office cantonal de la statistique—OCSTAT/Chan-
cellerie d’Etat 2012).
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by city council, and debates have been heated between the Alternative, which fa-
voured the renovation and the rest of the council ( Entente, UDC and MCG), which 
was opposed, principally because of the cost, demanding for a third time that the 
project be scaled down. Finally, a narrow majority accepted the renovation.50
6.5  Core Values and Strategies in the Political Arena
During these lively debates, the different parties’ core values become clear, as they 
do in the different party programmes51 and in our interviews and focus groups. We 
will focus on the core values regarding the local welfare state and specify the coali-
tions that have emerged for specific policy issues. Unemployment52 and childcare 
will serve to illustrate concrete policy orientations.
6.5.1  More or Less State Intervention?
In Geneva, core oppositions between political parties regarding the local welfare 
state are transforming the importance of the state, the fields of its interventions and 
how far its contributions are expected to go. It is not surprising that the more the 
parties can be categorised as being “on the left”, the more the state’s intervention is 
legitimated. For the Socialists, the state has a crucial role to play in the construction 
of society, which is based on solidarity, a society of opportunities and equalities, 
not of privileges. Other notions such as redistribution, access to public services, 
gender equality and jobs for all are the core values (deep core) indicated in their 
40-page programme for the 2013–2018 cantonal legislature.53 The Left Alliance’s 
policies are similar, but it emphasises class struggle and advocates policies that 
50 The third and final debate took place on 25 March 2014 at City Hall. These debates are always 
broadcast by Léman Bleu, the local television channel. The renovation project was finally ac-
cepted by a vote of 38 (the Alternative and two Independents) to 36 (Entente, UDC, MCG, the 
conservative, far-right and populist parties). There was one abstention (a member of the Greens), 
see Dethurens (2014).
51 Cantonal and city party programmes being identical, no distinction between the two levels has 
to be made.
52 In Switzerland, the economic crisis at the end of the 1980s marked a turning point regarding 
unemployment policies. In 1995, following the recommendation of the OECD Making Work Pay 
(Giraud 2007, p. 96), the Federal Unemployment Law was revised in the direction of workfare, 
activation, reciprocity and increased control over the unemployed. But this logic has been imple-
mented in different ways in different cantons. In Geneva, for instance, the focus has been on 
reintegration or even inclusion rather than control (Giraud 2007, p. 100). Since 1995, the cantons 
have had to fill the gap left by the reduction of federal assistance and implement social-assistance 
measures for the long-term unemployed who have exhausted their unemployment benefits, a new 
phenomenon in the country.
53 Party Programme of the Socialist Party of Geneva, 2013–2018 (Parti socialiste genevois 2013).
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are more radical and require maximal state intervention, for instance in matters of 
housing, childcare, unemployment and redistribution.54 For the Greens, the third 
traditional partner of these two parties, state intervention has to integrate the notion 
of sustainability.55 So all three parties propose greater redistribution and take on the 
wealthy in the canton, which, they claim, do not contribute as much as they should 
to public expenses. A shared value of this coalition is that the state should be the 
main regulator and provider of social services.
For the conservative and far-right parties, in contrast, state intervention should 
be kept to a minimum and bureaucracy and state expenses must be reduced (Radi-
cal-Liberals and Swiss People’s Party), or their increase has to be controlled (Chris-
tian Democratic Party), overlapping public services at the cantonal and federal lev-
els have to be eliminated and public administration and civil servants have to be 
re-evaluated. Notions like liberty, responsibility, solidarity, equality in rights and 
duties and prosperity are deep core values for the Liberal-Radical Party,56 while 
the Christian Democratic Party prefers a welfare mix, where non-profit organisa-
tions are seen as more able to solve social problems than the state57 but for-profit 
organisations are also understood to be essential for the well-being of society. All 
the three parties propose tax reductions. The MCG proposes that social welfare be 
maintained, but at the same time underlines the necessity to combat social fraud58 
(this last point is crucial for the UDC too). It has also adopted the slogan “Geneva 
first”, which is common among far-right and populist parties.59
From these party programmes, the differences between the political parties ap-
pear insurmountable, and we wonder how it is possible for Geneva to continue to 
have a “strong” welfare state with more social benefits than other cantons, as was 
54 In their programme, we can find phrases such as “social resistance”, “block the antisocial and 
antipopular politics of the right and far right” and “stop employers’ abuses” (Solidarités Genève 
2013).
55 See Les Verts Genevois (2013).
56 “The Liberal-Radical Party rejects the principle of assistance, rampant statism and all attempts 
at levelling on the basis that they kill personal initiative, the satisfaction derived from effort and 
work, entrepreneurship and exploration, all of which it promotes” (Les Libéraux-Radicaux de 
Genève—PLR 2013, p. 6). Original quotation: “Le PLR rejette le principe d’assistanat, l’étatisme 
rampant et toutes les tentatives de nivèlement par le bas qui tuent l’initiative personnelle, le goût 
de l’effort et du travail, la volonté d’entreprendre et d’explorer, qu’il promeut.”
57 “Indeed, the PDC believes that associations are the most effective way of promoting the politics 
of solidarity.” Original quotation: “En effet, le PDC considère que les associations sont les plus à 
même de mener des politiques de solidarité” (Parti démocrate chrétien Genève 2013).
58 Point 3 of the political charter of the party (MCG - Mouvement Citoyen Genevois 2014a).
59 For analyses of extreme-right movements in Switzerland, see Skenderovic and D’Amato (2008) 
and Skenderovic (2009).
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emphasised in the field of unemployment by the head of the Solidarity jobs60 at the 
Cantonal Office for Employment, during his interview.61
In my sense, this is rather unique in Switzerland: we are the only canton that 
has so many important additional cantonal welfare measures, at the cost of about 
60 million CHF,62 that are not covered by the LIASI.63 This is real, the human part 
of Geneva. And there is the real will of a canton-city to have a politics that reinte-
grates people (iIII, p. 8).
But if we look more attentively at the core values that are mentioned in the party 
programmes and also by our interviewed stakeholders, we can also see shared deep 
core values, characterised by notions like solidarity, humanism, individual respon-
sibility, respect for people and equal access to social opportunities. But with respect 
to the policy core, meaning the strategies used to attain the identified deep core, and 
even more the secondary aspects, we notice significant differences that correspond 
to classical right- and left-wing dichotomies regarding the role of the state, its legiti-
mate fields of intervention and, consequently, the amount of public taxes that have 
or do not have to be spent in these fields.
This agreement about deep core values, sometimes accompanied by a massive 
divergence in the policy core, is particularly pronounced in the fields of childcare 
and unemployment.
6.5.2  Childcare and Unemployment: State Versus Mixed 
Solutions
In the field of childcare, all parties except the Swiss People’s Party agree that there 
are insufficient numbers of childcare places available in the city and the canton. 
60 Solidarity jobs are jobs in the secondary labour market that are subsidised by the canton and 
target the long-term unemployed, are implemented by the Cantonal Office for Employment and 
were legitimised by popular vote in December 2007 (68.5 % in favour), see (République et canton 
de Genève 2007). While the Socialists and Greens agreed with the law, the far left, including trade 
unions, fought against it with the argument that it would result in downward pressure on wages and 
the use of cheap labour for public-administration jobs. Seven years after its introduction, debates 
on the issue remain heated, and there is increasing opposition to Solidarity jobs, including from the 
current socialist mayor of the city. See Syndicat interprofessionnel de travailleuses et travailleurs 
(Sit) (2013) and Salerno (2013).
61 As indicated above, 12 semi-directed interviews were conducted in Geneva with local stake-
holders during the WILCO research (see footnote 7) with a view to understanding their positions 
and core values regarding unemployment, childcare and housing, but also the local welfare system. 
The following topics were discussed in the interviews: the main problems and solutions in these 
areas; the reasons for a need to act, coalitions and the main differences between the stakeholders 
and between the parties in their positions and reasons for the importance or unimportance of the 
local welfare system. The analysis of the interviews is based on the actor-centred-institutionalism 
approach (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995; Scharpf 1997).
62 About 49 million €.
63 The cantonal law regarding social assistance and social inclusion.
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There is a fundamental agreement about the need to increase the number of child-
care places, the legitimacy of childcare outside the family and the idea of the social 
investment state.64 But the strategies the parties advocate to attain this aim differ, 
the left advocating public childcare places, funded by public taxes and standardised 
by public regulations and norms, including qualification criteria for its personnel, 
the far-right and conservative parties demanding more of a welfare mix with pub-
lic–private partnerships, enterprise nurseries, nannies, etc., and less state regulation.
Regarding unemployment, coalitions are moving regarding secondary aspects. 
Traditionally, right-wing parties advocate individual responsibility and claim that 
it is up to the individual to adapt to structural changes in the labour market and 
make the main effort to (re)integrate. By contrast, left-wing parties stress structural 
problems, the inadequacy of the jobs on offer, and the need to reform the labour 
market itself, for instance by adapting it to help resolve long-term unemployment 
by creating a subsidised labour market for some employment areas, as was the case 
with the Solidarity jobs. So while the core legitimacy of the Solidarity jobs was not 
really questioned, the concrete application caused lively debates and disagreements 
inside the leftist coalition itself, mostly regarding the type of contracts and the pay. 
Finally the far left (including the trade unions) was and continues to be opposed to 
the Solidarity jobs, criticising their tendency to reduce wages and their poor work-
ing conditions. Surprisingly, the conservative and far-right parties (and the employ-
ers’ association) accepted the idea, not without difficulty, of creating this secondary 
labour market for long-term unemployment, but only under certain circumstances 
(salary below the market prices, no competition with the private sector).
These two examples show us that political parties agree on the fundamental deep 
core of the existence of a local welfare state, which guarantees protection and help 
in case of need. Conflicts therefore revolve around the amount of financial assis-
tance, for instance, or who the provider of the services should be. But we may 
assume that the shared deep core values are relatively stable65 and that discussions 
and consensus or compromise occur with respect to the policy core and especially 
secondary aspects.
As stated above, debates take often place in pre-parliamentary arenas, as a re-
sult of which coalitions also include non-state actors. According to the previously 
quoted head of the Solidarity jobs, the creation of these jobs was a real partnership. 
Before the law was passed, we had people around the table who were in favour or 
against. We reflected together on what the legislation should look like. It was a first 
in terms of partnership (iIII/p. 8).
This partnership between different stakeholders seems to indicate that political 
parties and civil servants in the public administration have to take associations (for 
64 For a constructive critique of the social investment state, see Vandenbroucke and Vleminckx 
(2011).
65 Even the Swiss People’s Party speaks about the “need to guarantee social security for future 
generations” (UDC 2013, p. 27) but argues that the best way to do so is through “more market, less 
bureaucracy, less state regulation” (UDC 2013, p. 29). Regarding childcare, it claims that a child 
will never feel better than at home with its family (UDC 2013, p. 25).
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instance, non-profits) into account in debates or even look to their expertise. Other 
interviewees stated that non-profit-sector lobbies carry a certain weight in political 
debates, which would seem to contradict our claim that social policies are above all 
shaped by state actors and political parties. Indeed, it is clear that the canton and the 
city often work with non-profit organisations in the field of social policies. But what 
about the for-profit sector? How mixed is Geneva’s welfare system, and what does 
it indicate about its governance and the distribution of power and type of interac-
tion? And lastly, what about social innovation? Are the local welfare governance 
arrangements favourable to social innovation?
6.6  Geneva’s Welfare Governance Arrangements: State 
and Non-Profit Without For-Profit? What About 
Social Innovation?
Debates about social innovation have given rise to a large body of literature in the 
social sciences. The concept itself is ambiguous and has become a confusing “buzz-
word”, as underlined by Moulaert et al. (2013, p. 13):
In our opinion, the lack of clarity about the term “social innovation” can be attributed not 
only to its evolving analytical status but also to its over-simplistic use as a buzzword in 
a multiplicity of policy practices associated, for example, with the rationalization of the 
welfare state and the commodification of sociocultural wellbeing. The appropriation of 
the term by “caring liberalism”, in one of its new incarnations, has added to a Babel-like 
terminological confusion. (Moulaert et al. 2013, p. 13)
Following the definition of Oosterlynck et al., social innovations are “locally em-
bedded practices, actions and policies that help socially excluded and impoverished 
individuals and social groups to satisfy basic needs for which they find no adequate 
solution in the private market or institutionalized welfare policies through processes 
of social learning, collective action and awareness raising” (2013, p. 4).
So while one important aspect of social innovation is that it occurs on the local 
level, it must also be understood over a larger scale and be spread by collective ac-
tion. According to Evers and Ewert, social innovation also involves the novelty of 
an idea in the given context. Social innovations are ideas, turned into practical ap-
proaches; which are new in the context where they appear; attracting hopes for bet-
ter coping strategies and solutions; marked by a high degree of risk and uncertainty 
due inter alia to the specific context wherein they appear. […] Social innovations 
are, in a significant way, new and disruptive toward the routines and structures pre-
vailing in a given (welfare) system or local setting (Evers and Ewert 2014, p. 11).
It is obvious that what is new in a certain context is not necessarily so in another. 
As a result, social innovation can be overlooked by researchers if the practice is 
already well known in other countries or localities.
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In Geneva, the policies analysed by the WILCO project66 and the social inno-
vations pursued67 reveal a welfare system in which the state (either the canton or 
the city), and particularly the stakeholders in the public administration, has the 
predominant role in establishing social policies and concrete programmes, backed 
(more or less) by the political parties. However, in the matter of the delivery of 
social services, the state relies on non-profit organisations where possible. These 
organisations are heavily subsidised, and their rules and programmes are built on 
those of the public service. Indeed, the Solidarity jobs are subsidised by the canton 
and located only in non-profit organisations, creating a secondary labour market. 
Subsidies are therefore given directly to the relevant associations, which execute 
the decided measure (to give work to long-term unemployed individuals far from 
the primary labour market). Other programmes and measures, such as the social 
innovations examined here, reveal the same tendency, where for-profit actors are 
either absent or marginal.68
In contrast, regarding for instance the integration of (young) unemployed indi-
viduals, the City of Bern has chosen to build coalitions with economic partners and 
creates job opportunities in the primary labour market. These public-private part-
nerships are initiated and coordinated by the state and are a type of “quasi-market 
solution”69 (Felder 2013, p. 25) to unemployment.
In Geneva, the welfare governance arrangements, which favour the interplay be-
tween the state and non-profit organisations, and in which economic actors are ab-
sent, raise different issues. Battaglini et al. (2001, p. 18) demonstrate the relatively 
high degree of autonomy of non-profit organisations to realise public policies in the 
Swiss context. But they also emphasise their weak formal recognition by the state, 
66 The policy fields examined by the WILCO project (running time 2010–2013) were childcare, 
subsidised housing and unemployment.
67 The three social innovations that were examined during the WILCO project were as follows. (1) 
The UAC, which is part of the city’s Social Service, and which has four offices, located in different 
areas of the city. Its principal aim is to connect relevant associations with interested participants 
in civil society and, therefore, to reinforce collective action through better coordination and net-
working. (2) The ORIF project, an NGO that works to reintegrate young marginalised adults who 
experience multiple difficulties (health, disabilities, learning problems, etc.) that hinder them from 
entering the labour market. Support is long term (3 years) and multi-dimensional. The project is 
funded by the Office for Disability Insurance and is therefore a public programme. (3) The Unit 
for Temporary Housing (ULT) offers subsidised, temporary housing to vulnerable populations, 
taking into account various dimensions of social marginalisation by offering support from a team 
employed by the city. More information about these three innovations can be found in the relevant 
chapter of the e-book of the project (Kakpo and Cattacin 2014, pp. 367–380).
68 This is the case for the ORIF project (see previous footnote). Its Geneva office, located in 
Vernier, focuses primarily on education and training rather than on professional integration but 
with the aim of building partnerships with private enterprises. However, the ORIF project is not 
specific to Geneva but was instead created by a medical doctor in the Canton of Vaud in 1948 and 
implemented in nine locations in the French speaking cantons. The office in Vernier opened in 
2007 (ORIF 2014).
69 In fact, the subsidies are part of the wage; for instance, if an individual working in a private 
company can only work part-time because of a disability, the state provides the other half of the 
salary. That is why it is only a “quasi-market solution”.
1176 Social Policies and Governance in Geneva: What About Social Innovation?
not least because of a certain mistrust of these collective actors (2001, pp. 55, 58). 
Furthermore, non-profit organisations run the risk of being instrumentalised by the 
state, of being asked to act in neglected fields. Indeed, it is sometimes difficult to 
clearly define the border separating the state from non-profit organisations, whose 
intertwined nature contributes to the blurring of that border. For Evers (2000, 2005), 
the borders between the different providers of social services have to be questioned 
and newly defined, because
changes in the development of welfare states (such as trends towards more autonomy 
of single service organizations and an increasing intertwining between state and market 
spheres), linked with a stronger impact of new forms of participation in civil society, have 
led to a hybridization process in many organizations that provide social services. […] It is 
often hard to say where the third sector ends and the public sector begins. Drawing a line 
between the state-public and the third sector is thus an essentially political task (Evers 
2005, p. 745).
In Geneva, it is not so much that the public sector is influenced by non-profit organ-
isations, as it is that non-profit organisations have to adapt to the regulations and 
logic of the public sector.
So, in a context characterised by a strong state actor, dependent non-profit organ-
isations that tend to be instrumentalised and the clear separation of social policy and 
private economic activity, what about social innovation?
In the social policies we analysed,70 we witness innovation in governance (con-
sultation between the public administration, political parties and non-profit organ-
isations), for instance, for the Solidarity jobs. Regarding the Union for Community 
Action,71 the innovation involves the ways in which users are addressed, regulations 
and rights, modes of working and financing. But our observations did not reveal 
innovations in the nature of the local welfare system—for example, outreach to all 
sectors of the local welfare system, decreased standardisation and increased diver-
sification of welfare arrangements, increased reliance on community components 
such as families and support networks in mixed welfare systems, the integration of 
economic and social logics or the integration of welfare and urban politics (Evers 
and Ewert 2014, pp. 22–24). Furthermore, the instrumentalisation of non-profit or-
ganisations by the state is not indicative of a major social innovation because “this 
instrumentalisation of organisations issued out of civil society runs the risk of de-
stroying their potential for innovation and the renewal of grassroots democracy” 
(Battaglini et al. 2001, p. 58).72
This does not mean that non-profit organisations in Geneva cannot propose any 
innovative ideas but rather that the canton or city puts its pattern on them. Fur-
thermore, what could be identified as bottom-up initiatives at first glance actually 
70 For the innovations investigated by the WILCO project, see footnote 68.
71 See footnote 68.
72 Original quotation: “[…] cette instrumentalisation des organisations issues de la société civile 
risque de mener à la destruction de leur potentiel d’innovation et de renouvellement de la démocra-
tie de proximité”.
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correspond to city policy: Citizens are “encouraged” by the city to organise73 and 
express themselves. Since 2008, the City of Geneva has for example set up some 
“district” or “neighbourhood contracts” that enable people from the area to express 
themselves in working groups or neighbourhood assemblies.74 Or social innovation 
is linked to citizens’ everyday lives, to their active involvement, which is part of the 
design of the local welfare state and has to be included in the analysis of the gov-
ernance (Evers 2005). It is not surprising that Geneva has the lowest rate of formal 
and informal volunteering in Switzerland (Gundelach et al. 2010; Kettenacker and 
Cattacin 2008; Office fédéral de la statistique (OFS) 2011, pp. 7–10).75 Or active 
citizen involvement is also part of bottom-up initiatives, which are a key component 
of innovative social policies (Oosterlynck et al. 2013, p. 4).
An interesting hypothesis for this low degree of citizen engagement is the lack 
of an established city identity, or in other words, “the identity of not having one” 
(Cattacin and Kettenacker 2011). This could explain why the city tries so hard to 
provide a link between the citizens and the “international” city.
These considerations lead us to conclude that Geneva’s social innovations tend 
to be incremental and happen above all within state services, and that, because of 
attempts to control spending, new services are rarely created. Therefore, social in-
novations tend to be initiated from the top or are quickly regulated and standardised 
by the state. This state orientation is in line with the key core values of the welfare 
state as outlined in this chapter. Indeed, we think that the strong state orientation 
in Geneva, preoccupied by rising inequality over the past two decades (Beer 2013, 
pp. 35–44), results from its desire to safeguard equality and solidarity among citi-
zens, values that are shared by the stakeholders and political parties. But we also 
witness state control over social and urban policies and the wish to remain the le-
gitimate source of them.
6.7  Conclusion
According to a former state councillor, Geneva’s governance is like a machine built 
by the famous artist Tinguely: “his nuts and bolts are very complex”.76 In this chap-
ter, we have demonstrated that Geneva’s welfare governance follows a more tradi-
tional social-welfare policy approach in which the state endorse social responsibil-
ity for its citizens and adopts the leading role in the production and distribution of 
services. Furthermore, political parties and state administration prevail in deciding 
which social policies are adopted. In this dynamic, economic considerations are 
73 An example is the annual Neighbours Day (La fête des voisins). Invitations can be downloaded 
from the city’s website. Neighbours Day began in Paris in 2000 and is now celebrated in 1400 cit-
ies in 36 countries). Geneva participated for the first time in 2004 (Ville de Genève 2014b).
74 For further information, see Ville de Genève (2013).
75 In general, engagement in informal and formal volunteering is much more important in the 
Swiss-German parts of the country than in the French-speaking parts.
76 Public conference, 07.04.2014, University of Geneva.
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not related to social policies but handled separately. Furthermore, in its approach to 
social policies, Geneva focuses on social problems and aims to integrate or include 
those who suffer from social exclusion, or, even better, to avoid having socially 
vulnerable individuals become socially excluded.77 Key values are equality and 
solidarity. To fulfil social policies, the state relies essentially on non-profit organ-
isations whose mandates are in accord with the public sector. As a result, non-profits 
run the risk of being instrumentalised by the state.
In Geneva, it is difficult to implement anything other than incremental social 
innovation for several reasons. First, conflicts between the two state levels in-
volved in Geneva’s governance (overlooking the governance of the Grand Genève) 
coupled, second, with the constitutional possibility of vetoes (by the two levels of 
government and also by popular referendum) are a clear obstacle to social innova-
tion. While Czada (2003, p. 175) argued that these veto-structures are compensated 
for by a strong, stable, legislative majority, such is no longer the case in Geneva, 
whose politics are challenged by two “newcomer” parties. Third, moving coalitions 
in the political arena in recent years and the fact that there is no clear majority often 
leads to long and heated debates, and we can hypothesise that the consequence is 
that possible innovations are not adopted in a timely manner. Fourth, a strong state 
orientation, which excludes partners from the private for-profit sector and whose 
structures and routines are difficult to change, decreases the likelihood that any 
social innovations other than incremental ones are adopted and favours “top-down” 
innovations over “bottom-up” ones. We also witness “weak active citizenship” in 
Geneva. The question of whether the observed state orientation is responsible for 
this lack of civil participation or if it is vice versa remains open.
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